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Succession Under the Model Probate
Code, Some Comparisons with
the Montana-California Law
0J. HOWARD ToEmm
The Model Probate Code was prepared for the Probate Division of the Real Property Section of the American Bar Association.1 A principal draftsman was Lewis M. Simes, a former
member of the faculty at the Montana State University Law
School, now a Professor of Law at the University of Michigan
Law School. A comparison of its succession provisions with
those found in the present codes of Montana and California, exclusive of the community property provisions of the latter, follows herein.
The Model Code would abolish the estates of dower and
curtesy, and upon intestacy, would allow the spouse to take:
(1)
One-half the net estate if intestate is survived by
issue ; or
(2) The first five thousand dollars, and one-half the
remainder of the net estate, if there is no surviving issue but intestate is survived by one or more
parents, or by brothers or sisters or their issue; or
(3) All the net estate if there is no surviving issue or
parent or issue of a parent.8
And, if decedent left a will, the surviving spouse could elect to
receive the share in the estate that would have passed to him or
her had the testator died intestate, until the value of such share
amounted to $5000, and of the residue of the estate above the part
from which the full intestate share amounts to $5000, one-half
the estate that would have passed to the spouse had the testator
died intestate.
The share of the net estate not distributable to the surviving
spouse or the entire net estate if there is no surviving spouse
would descend and be distributed as follows:
*Professor of Law, Montana State University.
1
SIMES, MODEL PRORATE CODE, p. 5.
"Supre,note 1, p. 68; § 31.
-'uru note 1, p. 59; § 22.
'Supra$note 1, p. 68; § 32.
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(1)

To the issue of intestate: if all are in the same degree
of kinship to intestate, they shall take equally, or if of
unequal degree, those of more remote degrees shall take
by representation.
(2) If there is no surviving issue of the intestate, then to
the surviving parents, brothers, sisters, and the issue of
deceased brothers and sisters of the intestate. Each
living parent of the intestate shall be treated as of
the same degree as a brother or sister, and shall be entitled to the same share as a brother or sister. Issue of
deceased brothers and sisters shall take by representation.
(3) If there is no surviving parent or brother or sister of
intestate, then to the issue of brothers and sisters. If
such distributees are all of the same degree of kinship
to intestate, they shall take equally, or if of unequal
degree, then those of more remote degrees shall take
by representation.
(4) If there is no surviving issue, or parent of the intestate, or issue of a parent, then to the surviving grandparents of the intestate equally.
(5) If there is no surviving issue, or parent, or issue of a
parent, or grandparent of intestate, then to the issue
of deceased grandparents in the nearest degree of kinship to the intestate per capita without representation.
The degree of kinship shall be computed according to
the rules of the civil law; that is, by counting upward
from intestate to the nearest common ancestor and then
downward to the relative, the degree of kinship being
the sum of these two counts.
(6) If there is no person mentioned in the preceding five
parts, then to the state.
The Model Code would also entitle the surviving spouse or
minor children to the homestead and to such personal property
of the estate as is exempt from execution or forced sale under
the constitution and laws of the state, or such other personal
property as shall be selected, of the total appraised value of
$2000, whichever is greater, any portion or all of which could be
taken in money. This property would belong to the surviving
spouse, if any; otherwise, to the minor children in equal shares.
Flexibility is desired, extending to articles of sentimental value
'Supra, note 1, p. 60, § 22.
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and the family automobile. In addition, the surviving spouse
and minor children would be entitled to a reasonable allowance
in money out of the estate during the period of administration
according to their previous standard of living, but not for longer
than a year for insolvent estates.
The Montana code provides that a widow shall be endowed
of the third part of all lands whereof her husband was seized of
an estate of inheritance at any time during the marriage unless
the same shall have been relinquished in legal form.' Included
also are equitable estates and real estate contracted for during
the husband's lifetime the title to which is completed after his
death. This section,' first enacted in 1876, does not specifically
provide that the "third part" shall be for and during the
widow's "natural life." This, however, was the common-law
dower interest, and the preceding Act of the territorial legislature of 1866 specifically so provided.!
Moreover, a closely related and following section of the
present code provides that the widow shall have dower in the
surplus when a mortgage causes the husband's mortgaged land
to be sold which is provided to be "the interest or income of onethird part of such surplus for life as her dower."
In Swartz v. Smole," it was held that:
9(.. the duty of assigning dower as provided in R.C.M.
10168 rests upon those in possession of the husband's
real estate, and if this is not done within a reasonable
time after his death, she may sue such parties for its recovery and for damages to the extent of one-third the
annual value of the profits of the land."
While not a decision as to the "life" or "fee" nature of this onethird interest, the court does say at page 94 of 91 Montana, "The
common law right of dower is preserved in this state by Section
5813 Revised Codes 1921," and at page 95 of the same opinion,
the court observes that the widow stood upon her common-law
and statutory right to be endowed in the husband's real estate, a
right "which is superior to the claims of creditors, though under
Section 5821 a widow without issue has the right to take onehalf of the real estate that shall remain after the payment of all
debts."
"Supra,note 1, p. 79; § 42-44.
'R.C.M. 1947, § 22-101 (5813).
'LAWS OF MONTANA 1876, p. 63.
OLAWS OF MONTANA 1866, p. 38.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 22-104 (5816).
u91 Mont. 90, 5 P. (2d) 566 (1931).
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And in Dahlman v. Dahlman," it was held that where the
deceased husband left only his widow and his father and mother
surviving, the widow could elect to take one-half of the lands
absolutely after debts were paid-her substitute dower in addition to a one-half interest in the personalty and realty as an
heir of her husband. This was in accord with our succession
statute prior to the amendment of 1941' by which the widow
would now be sole heir in this situation. The court observed that
the right of election under the dower sections of the code "has
no connection with the right to take as heir one-half of the residue
of the estate real and personal after the claims of creditors are
satisfied. It is true that when the fee to her portion in lands has
vested in her under the right of succession, the dower right in
such property is pro tanto merged in the fee; but this in no wise
affects her right to dower in the residue of the estate." At page
377 of 28 Montana, the court observes that:
"The Code recognizes the common-law right of dower. At the same time it extends this right to estates to
which it did not attach at the common-law, and enlarges
the wife's right by the election granted her to take onehalf absolutely after payment of debts if there are no
issue. This estate falls to her not as heir but by virtue
of her marital right. But the succession statute grants
to the widow the right to succession and this right rests
upon exactly the same ground as that of any other heir. "
Our code provides that every devise or bequest shall bar a
widow's dower in lands or her share in personal estate unless
otherwise expressed in the will; but she may elect whether she
will take such devise or bequest, or whether she will renounce
the benefit of such devise or bequest and take her dower in the
lands and her share in the personal estate.1' This section first
appears in the ninth territorial session laws of Montana of date
1876,' and will be given meaning when one reflects that the second Montana territorial session of 1866 had enacted a code of
intestate succession by which the common-law had been changed
so that the spouse was an heir of the husband in certain situations; i.e., if intestate left no children or descendants and no
father or mother or brothers or sisters or their descendants, then
the estate both real and personal would go to the surviving
spouse."
"28 Mont. 373, 72 P. 748 (1903).

1941, p. 254.
UR.C.M. 1947, § 22-107 (5819).
"LAws OF MONTANA 1876, p. 65.
2L.&ws OF MONTANA 1866, Ch. 3.
"LAws OF MONTANA

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol13/iss1/2

4

Toelle: Succession under the Model Probate Code, Come Comparisons with th

SUCCESSION UNDER MODEL CODE
Moreover, the seventh territorial session of 1871-72 had provided that in addition to dower, the widow should be allowed, as
her absolute property, the family bible and other books not to
exceed in value $200; all spinning wheels, weaving looms, and
stoves, put up or kept for use; all family pictures, twenty head of
choice sheep, with their fleeces, and all yarn or cloth manufactured from the same; two choice cows; five swine, with the necessary food for them for six months; all wearing apparel of the
widow and children; and all the household goods, furniture, and
utensils not exceeding in value $750; and, second, there shall be
set aside for the widow or minor children the homestead of not
exceeding twenty acres and the dwelling house and appurtenances or one lot if in town with dwelling house not exceeding in
value $3000.'
When, therefore, in 1876 the ninth territorial legislature
passed our present code section on the widow's right of election
against a will, it did so contemplating these provisions of the then
current law, and the widow's share in the personal estate and her
dower in the lands was given meaning accordingly.
The next year, 1877, our present succession statutes were
passed.' Instead of a deferred heirship status as in 1866, the
widow was given a first position as heir along with the issue, and,
if there are no issue, she now takes the entire estate. Also, instead of the spelled-out items of personal property allowed to
the widow in 1872, she now takes her homestead right and her
interest in property exempt from execution as well as the wearing apparel of the family, the household furniture of the decedent, and reasonable provision for her support and that of her
minor children to be allowed by the court."
While, therefore, it may be regarded as unfortunate that the
phraseology of the widow's right to elect against the will has not
been changed to accord with her enhanced position as heir, it is
believed that, under the Dahlman decision," she is, in such case,
entitled to her interest as heir in the spouse's realty, together
with her right as distributee of the personalty under the general
succession statute,' as well as her dower interest in the residue
17

LAWs OF MONTANA 1871-2, p. 355.

"SLAWS OF MONTANA 1877, p. 364.

"R.C.M. § 91-2401 (10144) Ch. 24, first enacted as LAws OF MONTANA
1877, p. 272.

'Supra, note 12.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 91-403 (7073).
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of the realty,' together with her interest under current legislation
enacted for her support and that of her minor children."
The present Montana succession statute was passed in 1877
and followed California law on the subject. California in turn
had taken its rules of succession from Mexican law following the
cession of California to the United States in 1848. A statute of
descents-was first enacted in 1850, which, with modification in
1862, became a part of the California Civil Code. It has been
said that the common-law rules by which real estate, on the owner's death, vested in the heir and personalty in the personal
representative, never obtained in California, title to all property,
whether real or personal, vesting at once in the heir as under
the Mexican system, though subject to the claims of administration."
Our Montana code provides that when any person having
title to any estate dies intestate, it is succeeded to as follows:
Clause I-If decedent leaves a surviving husband or wife, and
only one child, or the lawful issue of one child, in
equal shares to the surviving spouse and child or issue
of such child.
If decedent leaves a spouse and more than one child
living, or one child living and the lawful issue of one
or more deceased children, one-third to the spouse
and the remainder in equal shares to the children and
to the lawful issue of any deceased child, by right of
representation; but if there is no child of decedent
living at his death, the remainder goes to all of his
lineal descendants; and if all of the descendants are
in the same degree of kindred to the decedent, they
share equally, otherwise they take according to the
right of representation. If the decedent leaves no
spouse, but leaves issue, the whole estate goes to the
issue; if such issue consists of more than one child
living, or one child living and the lawful issue of one
or more deceased children, then the estate goes in
equal shares to the children living, or to the child living and the issue of the deceased child or children by
right of representation. '
The explicit character of these provisions leaves little
2
1Supra, note
2

7.
1Supra,note 19.
CAi. Jun. 450.
'
Supra, note 21.

219
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occasion for construction by the courts which usually
content themselves with reiterating the clause applicable to the case before them.
Clause II-If the decedent leaves no issue, the whole estate
goes to the surviving spouse. This is by virtue of
the 1941 amendment ; formerly one-half was shared
with the father and mother, or if both were dead with
the brothers and sisters of deceased, and the children
of deceased brothers and sisters who took by right
of representation. California has not changed this
provision to increase the share of the spouse; it was
amended in California in 1931 to allow issue of the
parents to take if the parents were dead, the issue to
take by right of representation.'
Clause 2 further provides that if decedent leaves
neither issue nor spouse, the estate goes to father and
mother equally or if either is dead to the other.
Clause III-Clause 3 provides that in the absence of issue,
spouse, father or mother, the brothers and sisters of
decedent take equally and the children of any deceased brother or sister take by right of representation. This provision was changed in California in
1905 to include grandchildren of deceased brothers
and sisters; it was further changed in 1931 to include
descendants of deceased brothers and sisters who were
to take by right of representation.' Under the former
California wording (still Montana's), it was held that
a second cousin of decedent is not an heir when there
is surviving a brother who would take under this
clause.' It was also uniformly held that the term
"children" did not include grandchildren who could
not take under this clause.' If grandchildren of a
deceased brother or sister alone survived decedent,
the estate went to the next of kin under what is now
Clause 4 of the Montana statute.'
Clause IV-If decedent leaves neither issue, nor spouse, nor father nor mother, nor brother nor sister, the estate
'Supra, note 13.
'"Cal. Prob. Code 1949, § 223; 9 CAL. JuR. 458.
tmCal. Prob. Code 1949, § 225; 9 Cii- Jur. 459.
t
in re Eggers' Estate, 114 Cal. 464, 46 P. 380 (1896).
'Estate of Curry, 39 Cal. 529 (1870) ; Estate of Caffrey, Coffey's Prob.
Dec. 439.
nEstate of Caffrey, 8upra, note 30.
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goes to the next of kin in equal degree excepting that
where there are two or more collateral kindred in
equal degree, but claiming through different ancestors, those claiming through the nearest ancestors
must be preferred to those claiming through an ancestor more remote. Thus, a niece or nephew being in
the third degree would take in preference to an uncle
or aunt also of the third degree since the former
traces through the father while the latter traces from
the grandfather.
In line with California constructions, the right of
nephews or nieces to share in the property under
clause 3 is contingent on the accompanying of a
brother or sister of decedent. In other words, the
nephews' or nieces' right to inherit under Clause 3
needs to be aided by the surviving presence of an
uncle or aunt, brother or sister, of the intestate."
It was, however, sufficient that the surviving brother
or sister be of the half-blood of decedent though the
parent of the niece or nephew was of the whole blood.TM
If there are no surviving brothers or sisters of decedent, then this Clause 4 is operative; namely, that the
estate goes to the next of kin in equal degree with the
exception indicated for the collaterals claiming
through different ancestors; those claiming through
the nearest ancestors are then preferred. It was said
of this provision in California as it read formerly
that:
"In every other clause of the civil code, the
legislature specified inheritance by right of
representation when inheritance in this manner was intended; the failure to mention it
here leads to the conclusion that the legislature intended that descent should here go to
all next of kin in equal degree per capita. "'
Our code provides that the rule of computation laid
down for collaterals is that of the civil law.' Accordingly, nephews and nieces-3rd degree-are near"Estate of Nigro, 149 Cal. 702, 87 P. 384 (1906) ; In re Carwody's Estate,
88 Cal. 616, 26 P. 373 (1891) ; In re Ingram's Estate, 78 Cal. 586, 21 P.
435 (1889) ;Estate of Linehan, Myrick's Prob. Rep. 83, 9 CA&iJuR. 459.
'Estate of Lynch, 132 Cal. 214, 64 P. 284 (1901).
49 CAL.Jup. 465.
T
R.C.M. 1947, § 94-410 (7080).
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er in degree to decedent than grandnephews and
grandnieces-4th degree-and also nearer than a
cousin once removed-Sth degree-and take to the
exclusion of them.
Assume that decedent leaves a brother, a niece, and
two grandnephews, that the niece is a child of decedent's deceased brother, and the grandnephews are
issue of decedent's deceased sister. Clause 3 applies, and the brother and the niece will divide the
estate, the Montana statute only making provision for
children of deceased brothers and sisters. In California, the estate would be divided three ways, with
the grandnephews taking each one-sixth-per stirpes
-by virtue of the 1905 amendment providing for
grandchildren" and the 1931 amendment providing
for descendants of deceased brothers and sisters.' It
is believed the Montana statute should be amended
to make this fairer distribution.
Assume that decedent leaves no brother nor sister, but
leaves a niece and two grandnephews, that the niece
is a child of decedent's deceased brother, and the
grandnephews are issue of decedent's deceased sister. Clause 4 applies, and the niece takes all the
estate since she is in the 3rd degree while the grandnephews are in the 4th degree as next of kin are
measured by the civil law. It is believed that an
amendment to Clause 4, in line with the 1931 change
in California, allowing descendants of deceased brothers and sisters to represent the stirpes would make
for a fairer distribution. Thus, in California, the provision for next of kin in Clause 4 remains, but takes
effect further removed from decedent than was formerly there provided.'
Clauses V and VIWhile the California-Montana code provisions have
been said to be
"In re Ross Estate ...... C
Cal....... , 202 P. 641 (1921).
'Supra, note 28.
'*Cal. Prob. Code 1949, § 226 (If the decedent leaves neither issue,
spouse, parent, brother, sister, nor descendant of a deceased brother or
sister, the estate goes to the next of kin in equal degree, excepting that,
when there are two or more collateral kindred in equal degree, but
claiming through different ancestors, those who claim through the nearest ancestor must be preferred to those claiming through an ancestor
more remote.)
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"based on the general sentiments of mankind, and not on the obsolete feudal reasons
on which the common-law doctrine of in.
heritance of realty was based,' '
these clauses sound suspiciously like the ancestral
property notions of the feudal common-law. They
provide that if decedent dies under age without having married, all the estate that came to decedent by
succession from a parent goes in equal shares to the
other children of the same parent and to the issue of
any other of such children who are dead, by right of
representation; or if all the children of such parent
are dead, and any of them has left issue, to such issue,
and if all the issue are in the same degree of kindred
to decedent, they share equally, otherwise they take
by right of representation.
Ordinarily, when a person dies leaving neither spouse
nor issue, the estate goes to his parents or the survivor of them. But under this section if a child dies
without having been married, any property which
came to him by succession from a parent goes to the
other children of that parent. The question arises:
Is not the relationship more vital than the origin of
the estate? If the mother is ordinarily the heir, it
may be asked why she should be eliminated in favor
of the brothers and sisters because the property came
from the father.' A certain confusion results when
the statute contains a general rule followed by exceptions for particular cases. The whole modern trend
is away from the doctrine of ancestral property, and
it is not to be found in the Model Probate Code. It is
believed that this exception accomplishes no useful
purpose and that it should be repealed.
As to the half-blood relatives, the Montana code provides that they inherit equally with those of the
whole-blood unless the inheritance came to intestate
by descent, devise or gift of some one of his ancestors,
in which case all those not of the blood of such ancestors must be excluded from the inheritance. This
is another vestigial survival of the feudal ancestral
property doctrine. A majority of the states have
'Estate of Smith, 131 Cal. 433, 63 P. 729 (1901) ; 9 CM.. Jur.450.
R.614.

"0 See Comment8 on the Probate Code, 19 CAY. L.
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repudiated the doctrine of ancestral estates.' Only
thirteen jurisdictions have statutes similar to this
California-Montana type regarding the status of the
half-blood. The trend in most jurisdictions has been
to narrow the instances in which half-blood are excluded from inheriting. Following this trend, California has restricted the discrimination against the
half-blood who are not of the blood from which the
property came to instances where there are whole
blood of the same degree." It is believed that the
statute should be repealed, and the Model Code provision substituted that kindred of the half-blood shall
inherit the same share which they would have inherited if they had been of the whole blood."
Clause VII-This clause provides for escheat to the state if decedent leaves no spouse or kindred.
The English statute of succession was amended a few
years ago to cut off the right of inheritance by distant
relatives." It has been urged that there is no good
reason why cousins, at any rate those beyond the 4th
degree, namely first cousins, should have any right of
inheritance." Such distant relatives usually have no
such contact with deceased as to make them dependent
on him or to bring them within the circle of his warm
affection. If decedent did not care enough for such
distant relatives as to make testamentary provision
for them, it may well be argued that the state should
take the property. In the San Francisco area, prolonged litigation by distant relatives has developed in
some notable .cases to establish heirship. Such cases
are calculated to be long and costly, an invitation t6
heir-hunting and false testimony, a burden on the
time of courts, and a waste of the taxpayer's money.
However, since the state is viewed with perhaps a
measure of justified suspicion, in these days of free
spending and high taxes, it is doubted that any proposed change at this point would meet with success.
Thus, the Montana scheme of intestate succession is
in accord with the modern trend so far as real and
"42 YAI L. J. 101; 29 CAL. L. R. 79.

"In re Warnock's Estate, 36 Cal. App. (2d) 464, 97 P. (2d) 831 (1940).
"Supra, note 1, p. 64, § 24.
"Administration of Estates Act (1925), 15 Geo. V, ch. 23, § 46.
"Supra, note 40, p. 613.
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personal property are distributed in exactly the same
way, but the system is faulty in that:
It does not make adequate provision for the
widow, and it makes a distinction between the
right of a surviving husband and that of a surviving wife. The widow's dower remains, but in
1895, the husband's curtesy was abolished. The
Model Probate Code would abolish both the estates
of dower and curtesy. It is said that these estates
tend to clog land titles and make alienation more
difficult." Also, at the present time, so much of
the wealth of a decedent is likely to be in the form
of bonds and shares, that dower and curtesy do not
make adequate provision for a surviving spouse.
The substitutes for them in the Model Code provide intestate shares that are more liberal in case
of a solvent estate; however, both are subject to
decedent's debts. Under the Model Code, the
spouse may also liberally elect against the will.
2. Certain vestiges of the feudal doctrine of ancestral property survive contrary to the modern
trend in Clauses 5 and 6. Under English rules it
was once the law that the heir must trace descent
from the person last seized. This doctrine was
adopted in American statutes in some states by
provision for a different line of descent when
realty came to intestate by descent, devise or gift
from some one of his ancestors. Gradually these
statutes have been repealed. It is believed that
this Montana survival, while not so sweeping as
the foregoing, should also be repealed.
1.

The half-blood statute perpetuates an unjustified
discrimination in favor of the whole-blood which
has no place in a modern code.
The Model Code would first give a very substantial share to
the surviving spouse. The lineal heirs would take to the most
remote degree. By the English rule, lineal descendants take per
stirpes, the children being the stirpes though all children are
dead. But the Model Code provides that distribution is per
stirpes only if the claimants are in unequal degrees, and in that
case the stirpes are those represented by living claimants in the
3.

"Supra, note 1, p. 68, § 31.
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nearest degree to the intestate." This would be different from
the interpretation of the Montana-California code provision in
Maude v. Catherwood,' where the estate of S. Clinton Hastings,
first Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court and founder
of the Hasting's College of Law, was in controversy. The court
found that taking by representation enabled one great-grandchild
to take a portion twice as large as each of the shares of three
grandchildren who, of course, are a degree closer in kinship. Legislative adoption of the Model Code would avoid this result.
Under it:
"Representation refers to a method of determining
distribution in which the takers are in unequal degrees
of kinship with respect to intestate, and is accomplished
as follows: after first determining who are in the nearest degree of kinship of those entitled to share in the
estate, the estate is divided into equal shares, the number
of shares being the sum of the number of living persons
who are in the nearest degree of kinship and the number
of persons in the same degree of kinship who died before
the intestate, but who left issue surviving; each share of
a deceased person in the nearest degree shall in turn be
divided in the same manner among his surviving children and the issue of his children who have died leaving
issue who survive the intestate; this division shall continue until each portion falls to a living person. All dis"Supra, note 1, p. 62, § 22.
"155 P. (2d) 111. The question presented was at what generation the
estate should be divided. Appellant contended that, since no children
survived, it should be divided into six parts at the level of granchildren rather than at the level of children, and that the two great-grandchildren should take the shares of their parents by representation.
Under this method, the grandchildren and the great-grandchildren
would each have received a like amount, namely, one-sixth. Under the
court's method, one-eighth went to some grandchildren and great-grandchildren and one-fourth to one great-grandchild. In 33 CAL. L. R. 327,
it is suggested that if the statute is to continue to provide as it now
does, that when all the descendants are of the same degree to testator
they take in equal shares, there should be an additional proviso, that
where they are of unequal degrees of consanguinity, "those who are
living and of the nearest degree take the shares they would take, if
all the descendants of the same degree who had died but whose issue
survive, were alive, and that the issue of such deceased descendants
take their shares by representation."
See the Pa. Stat., Purdon Compact Ed. 1936, Title 20, § 55: "Each of
the grandchildren, if there be no children, in like manner shall receive
such share as he or she would have received if all the other grandchildren, who shall then be dead, leaving Issue, had been living at the
death of the intestate, and so in like manner to the remotest degree.
In every such case, the issue of such deceased child, grandchild, or other
descendant shall take by representation of their parents, respectively,
such shares only as would have descended to such parents if they had
been living at the death of the intestate."
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tributees except those in the nearest degree are said to
take by representation."
In general, Anglo-American statutes dealing with inheritance by collateral heirs are based on two systems, the parentelic
system and the civil law system, though most of them represent
a combination of the two. Under the parentelic system, if there
are no lineal descendants, the nearest ascendents, namely the parents, take, and then their issue to the remotest degree by representation. In the absence of the parents and their issue, grandparents take, and if none, then the issue of grandparents in like
manner as the issue of parents. This process may be continued
indefinitely as more and more ascendents and their issue are permitted to take.
In accordance with the civil law system, the heirs are those
who are nearest in degree to intestate. Degrees are determined
by counting from decedent up to the common ancestor and then
down to the claimant. The total is the degree of relationship of
claimant to decedent. As between two claimants, the one removed from intestate by the smaller number of degrees is the distributee. It differs from the common law method of reckoning
consanguinity in that in the latter, after determining the common ancestor, it was proper to count down on one side of the
collateral line only, and if there was a difference in number on
the two sides, it should be that side on which the most remote of
them was found. Thus, under the common law method, uncles,
nephews and first cousins would all be in the second degree; but
in the civil law system, uncles and nephews would be in the third
degree while first cousins would be in the fourth degree." The
civil law method is regarded as making for fairer distribution and
now obtains in all states except North Carolina, and, to some extent, in New York w
The parentelic system is followed in the Model Code up to
a certain point. However, parents take equally with, and not in
preference to brothers and sisters. As to inheritance by issue of
deceased grandparents, the civil law system is followed.'
It is interesting to students of the Montana Intestate Succession Law that the second Montana territorial session of 1866 gave
us a code more nearly resembling the modern Model Probate Code
than the 1877 product that came to us by way of California. The
"See the two systems explained in McDowell v. Addams, 45 Pa. 430
(1863).
'BINGHAM-COSTIGAN,

"Supra, note 1, p. 63.

CASES ON WILTS,

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol13/iss1/2

3rd Ed., p. 14.
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SUCCESSION UNDER MODEL CODE
1866 law provided that, subject to the payment of debts and the
widow's dower, both realty and personalty should descend and
be distributed to,:
1. The children and descendants in equal parts,
2. If there were no descendants, to the father and
mother and brothers and sisters in equal parts,
3. And if none in this second class, then to the spouse,
and if no spouse, to the grandfather, grandmother,
uncles and aunts and their descendants in equal
parts, and
4. If there were no survivors in classes 1, 2, or 3, then
to the great-grandfather and grandmother and their
descendants in equal parts and so on in other cases
passing to the nearest lineal ancestors and their children and their descendants in equal parts.'
Thus, this early Act did not incorporate the objectionable
ancestral property doctrine of clauses 5 and 6 of the present
code. While it gave to the widow only a deferred position as
heir, its dower provision for her was not wholly unsuited to the
landed society of 1866; and as to the half-blood, it provided that
if part of the collaterals be of the whole blood of intestate and
part of the half-blood, those of the half-blood shall inherit only
half as much as those of the whole blood." This proviso was to
be applied without regard for the origin of the property and it,
at any rate, had the merit of not wholly excluding the half-blood.
A salute to the memory of the 1866 draftsmen!
Supra, note 16, ch. 3. Per stirpes inheritance was also provided.
'3Supra, note 16, ch. 3, § 4.
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